

Bills Without Scrutiny: The Decline of Deliberation in India's Parliament

Abstract

This article examines the decline of legislative scrutiny in India's Parliament and its consequences for democratic representation. While the Parliament continues to enact laws, processes like floor debate, committee referral, questioning, and public consultation have narrowed. In the 17th Lok Sabha, only 16% of bills were referred to committees, 35% were passed after less than an hour of discussion in the Lok Sabha, and Members of Parliament were suspended on 206 instances across both Houses. In the 2026 Monsoon Session, the Lok Sabha passed 11 bills, nine of which saw no participation from any member other than the Minister introducing them, while the House functioned for only 15% of its scheduled time.

The article argues that reduced scrutiny weakens representation by limiting the ability of Members of Parliament, experts, and affected communities to question, amend, and shape legislation. It contends that law-making without meaningful deliberation produces a thinner form of representation: laws may command formal majorities, but those most affected may have little opportunity to be heard before enactment.

Introduction

In August 2026, the Lok Sabha passed several bills in a session marked by disruption and near-empty benches. Some bills were cleared within minutes; others were passed without any member other than the introducing Minister speaking on them. The image is familiar: Parliament functioning, bills being passed, and the formal machinery of law-making continuing. The time to question a bill, the opportunity to refer it to a committee, and the space for affected people and experts to be heard before a law takes effect, has been lost along the way.

This narrowing of scrutiny raises a question that goes beyond parliamentary procedure. If laws are passed with little deliberation, what happens to representation? Members may still occupy their seats and vote along party lines, but their capacity to examine the government, challenge legislation, and articulate public concerns becomes thinner. Representation, in this sense, is not only about who is present in Parliament; it is about whether Parliament can meaningfully receive and respond to the interests of those it governs.

This article examines that problem through the decline of legislative scrutiny in India. It looks at committee referral, floor debate, questioning, and pre-legislative consultation, and asks why these mechanisms have weakened.

Methodology

This article uses a mixed descriptive approach, combining quantitative indicators of parliamentary functioning with a qualitative case study of a recently enacted law. The quantitative data are drawn primarily from PRS Legislative Research's "Vital Statistics" on the functioning of Parliament, including data on the share of bills referred to committees, time spent debating bills, parliamentary sitting days, Question Hour functioning, and suspensions of Members of Parliament. PRS compiles these indicators from official

parliamentary records, including the bulletins of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha, the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs' statistical material, and its own legislative tracking.

The article uses three indicators to assess the state of legislative scrutiny: the proportion of bills referred to parliamentary committees, the time given to bills on the floor of each House, and the functioning of mechanisms such as Question Hour and parliamentary sittings. These indicators do not measure the quality of scrutiny directly. Rather, they show whether the institutional spaces through which Members of Parliament can question, debate, and amend legislation were available and used.

The analysis is interpretive rather than causal. Declining committee referral, shorter debates, and fewer opportunities for questioning are treated as indicators of weakened scrutiny, not as proof that every quickly passed law was inadequately examined. The article also considers alternative explanations, including parliamentary disruption, executive dominance, party discipline, and the shrinking parliamentary calendar.

1. What Parliament Is For

The Indian Constitution does not just treat Parliament as a body in which laws are enacted. Article 79 establishes a Parliament for the Union, consisting of the President and two Houses: The Council of States and the House of the People, known as the Rajya Sabha and the Lok Sabha [1]. It is the Union's Legislature. Three features show what else it is meant to be.

First, the government is accountable to the Parliament. Article 75(3) makes the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the House of the People [1]. The government is therefore answerable to the elected House, and so the Parliament is where it is expected to explain its decisions.

Second, members enjoy freedom of speech. Article 105(1) guarantees freedom of speech in Parliament, provided it adheres to the Constitution and the rules governing the Parliament's procedure [1]. This allows members to question and criticize the government on the floor.

Third, committees handle a significant portion of the detailed work. The system of department-related standing committees has been in place since 1993 [2]. These committees examine subjects specific to sectors, the budgets of the ministries, and the bills sent to them [3].

Taken together, these make Parliament the principal national forum in which the government explains and defends its decisions, and in which those who disagree with it can say so and be heard.

This article argues that Parliament has not stopped legislating but has increasingly stopped examining what it legislates. In the 17th Lok Sabha, only 16% of bills were referred to committees, 35% were passed after less than an hour of discussion in the Lok Sabha, and members of Parliament (MPs) were suspended on 206 instances across both Houses [3]. When bills pass without debate, the government is not being made to explain itself. When committees are bypassed, the closer examination happens nowhere. And when members are

suspended in large numbers, the freedom to speak is of little use to those no longer in the chamber.

2. Nine of 11

In the Monsoon Session of 2026, the Lok Sabha passed 11 bills. Nine of them were passed without a single MP speaking on the bill other than the Minister moving it [4]. The Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Amendment Bill was the only bill discussed for more than an hour in the Lok Sabha, with 48 MPs participating; it was also discussed in the Rajya Sabha [4].

The contrast is the point. Parliament can deliberate when a bill is given the time. The question is why so many bills are not.

The picture is not simple. PRS Legislative Research (PRS), an independent non-profit that tracks Parliament, describes the session as marked by repeated disruptions, with the Lok Sabha functioning for only 15% of its scheduled time and the Rajya Sabha for 33% [4]. One bill introduced during the session, the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Bill, was not passed; it was referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee for examination. The remaining bills passed by Parliament illustrate the session's pattern of limited deliberation. Kiren Rijju, the Parliamentary Affairs Minister said the government was not satisfied with the quality of discussion, though he blamed the opposition for not allowing proper debate [5]. A fair reading must therefore ask who bears responsibility for a House that passes laws in silence.

This article understands “representation” in three ways. The first is arithmetic: how many seats each party holds. The second is voice: whether those seats can question and amend in ways that affect outcomes. The third is reach: whether the House can take in the interests of people who are not in it. A parliament can be complete on the first layer and thin on the other two.

3. What Scrutiny Involves

Scrutiny can sound abstract, so it helps to be concrete about what is lost when it is skipped.

Take **committees**. In the 17th Lok Sabha (2019 to 2024), committees took on average nine meetings to finalise a report on a bill, and half of the reports were presented within 115 days [3]. The Joint Committee on the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 met 78 times over more than two years [3]. A chamber of 543 members, debating for an hour, cannot do this kind of work. Yet the committees' capacity is mostly spent elsewhere: only 2% of the reports presented by the department-related standing committees were on bills, against 48% on action taken and 31% on budgets [3]. Ronojoy Sen of the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) at the National University of Singapore notes that, with some exceptions, the committee system has worked reasonably well, particularly with regard to bipartisanship [6].

The floor of the House shows the same thinness. In the 17th Lok Sabha, only 9% of bills saw even one instance of recorded voting [3]. On average between 2019 and 2023, about 80% of

the budget was voted on without discussion, and in 2023 the entire budget was passed without discussion [3].

Scrutiny also begins before a bill reaches Parliament. The Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy, adopted by the government in 2014, is an executive policy and not a law. It asks ministries to publish a draft bill, or at least its justification, essential elements, financial implications and expected impact on matters such as the environment and fundamental rights, for a minimum of 30 days, together with an explanatory note in simple language [7]. The policy is not binding on ministries. In an analysis published in 2022, Chakshu Roy of PRS cited researchers who found that 227 of the 301 bills introduced in Parliament since the policy began were presented without any prior consultation, and that of the 74 placed in the public domain for comment, at least 40 did not adhere to the 30-day period [8]. On that evidence, the committee stage is often the principal institutional space in which affected groups, experts, and civil-society organisations can be heard before a bill becomes law.

4. Why Referral Matters

The case for referring bills to committees begins with a simple fact: MPs are not experts in every subject that comes up for debate [8]. A committee can take testimony from experts and give stakeholders a chance to be heard in a way a floor debate cannot [8]. When the standing committee system was set up in 1993, Vice-President K. R. Narayanan said its main purpose was to make the government more accountable to Parliament through more detailed consideration of measures, and that the aim was to strengthen the administration, not to criticise it [8]. Chief Justice N. V. Ramana remarked in 2021 that legislation often has gaps and ambiguities that create litigation and inconvenience for the public and the government [8].

Two constitutional amendments show the difference referral can make. The Goods and Services Tax amendment was examined by a committee of Rajya Sabha MPs, which heard expert testimony and travelled across the country to gather public feedback before the bill was debated in both Houses, a process that took about 18 months. The 2019 amendment providing 10% reservation for economically weaker sections took two days: it was passed by the Lok Sabha on the day it was introduced and by the Rajya Sabha the next day, with no committee examination [8]. Roy offers a similar contrast from a single session: Parliament spent five years examining a surrogacy bill but passed an amendment linking electoral rolls to Aadhaar in under two hours [8].

The subject of this article's main case offers a closer example. The government introduced the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Bill in 2016 on 2 August. The Standing Committee on Social Justice and Empowerment received it on 8 September and reported on 21 July 2017. The committee observed that the bill's definition of a transgender person was against global norms and violated the right to self-determined gender identity, and it recommended defining discrimination, extending the ban on discrimination to public and private establishments, and addressing reservations and civil rights [9]. I do not suggest a committee would have reached the same view on the 2026 amendment, whose definition

differs. The point is that an earlier bill on the same subject was examined in this way, and the 2026 bill, which removes the right to self-perceived identity [10], was not.

Referral is not a cure. A committee can only recommend, and a government need not accept what it recommends. Committees also take time: the 2016 committee took more than ten months, and the GST exercise about 18. The executive sometimes sees referral as a way to delay its legislative agenda [8]. But PRS's data show that half of the reports on bills in the 17th Lok Sabha were presented within 115 days [3], so delay is not inevitable. And referral currently depends on the presiding officer. Roy notes that a bill introduced in a House can be referred to the appropriate committee, that ministers often press the presiding officer not to refer it, and that the rules of parliamentary functioning do not mandate committee scrutiny [8].

5. Then and Now

This article does not claim a golden age. The verified data that has been used begin with the 14th Lok Sabha, and there's been a noticeable change within the span of a few Parliaments.

The share of bills referred to committees has fallen sharply. Under the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), 60% of the bills in the 14th Lok Sabha and 71% in the 15th were referred to committees [3][6]. As per PRS's count, the figure plunged to 28% in the 16th, 16% in the 17th, and 21% in the 18th till the 2026 Monsoon Session [3][4]. Sen dates this decline to after 2014 [6]. ISAS reported 26% for the 18th Lok Sabha in January 2026 [6]; the PRS figure covers a later date and more bills.

The Lok Sabha has been sitting for fewer days and passing bills faster. Lok Sabha annual sitting days on an average have plummeted from 135 in the first Lok Sabha to 55 in the 17th [3]. Over its whole term, the 17th Lok Sabha held 274 sittings, the fewest of any full-term Lok Sabha, and 11 of its 15 sessions were adjourned early [3]. It was the first Lok Sabha not to elect a Deputy Speaker for its entire term, despite Article 93 requiring one [3]. 58% of its bills were passed within two weeks of introduction, and 35% were discussed for less than an hour in the Lok Sabha (34% in the Rajya Sabha) [3]. The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Bill in 2019 and the Women's Reservation Bill in 2023 both were passed within two days of introduction [3]. MPs were suspended 206 times across both Houses [3].

Ministers have also answered to the House less often. Question Hour functioned for 60% of its scheduled time in the Lok Sabha and 52% in the Rajya Sabha in the 17th Lok Sabha, and only 24% of the questions listed for oral response in the Lok Sabha and 31% in the Rajya Sabha were answered orally by Ministers in the House [3].

The anti-defection law also limits what an individual MP can do. It was added through the 52nd Amendment in 1985 to combat political defections, and it provides for disqualification of a legislator who votes contrary to the party whip [11]. The Tenth Schedule does not mention how bills are examined, but its practical effect is that a member's vote is largely decided before debate begins. A member unmoved by argument has little reason to listen.

In practice, these changes alter what an MP is in practice: less an individual voice in a long debate, more a party vote in a short one.

6. Four Episodes

The Criminal Law Bills, 2023

146 MPs were suspended during the Winter Session of 2023, and the three bills replacing the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Indian Evidence Act were passed following the suspension [3]. These bills rewrote the fundamental rules of crime, evidence, and procedure.

The government's defence finds some support in PRS's data. The Home Minister said earlier versions of the bills had been scrutinized by a parliamentary standing committee, and the government had introduced fresh bills in place of official amendments [12]. PRS notes that the three criminal law bills were examined together over 12 committee meetings [3]. So, these were not bills nobody had looked at. The question remains whether committee review of earlier drafts constitutes scrutiny of the final text, a question the suspended members couldn't pose in the chamber.

The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Act, 2026

The Lok Sabha approved the amendment by voice vote on 24 March 2026, with the opposition exiting the chamber to protest the decision not to refer it to a select or standing committee [13]. PRS notes that the bill was debated in the Lok Sabha for two hours and twenty-six minutes, with 15 members participating, and in the Rajya Sabha for three hours and forty-four minutes, with 23 members taking part, and it was not sent to a standing committee [14]. On 25 March, the Rajya Sabha passed the bill by voice vote after rejecting the opposition's proposed amendments and refusing their request for a select committee [15]. The President gave assent in the same month [16].

According to PRS's summary, the bill eliminates the Act's current definition of a transgender person, specifies that the definition won't encompass individuals with different sexual orientations and self-perceived sexual identities, and requires the District Magistrate to issue a certificate after examining the recommendation of a designated medical board led by a Chief Medical Officer or Deputy Chief Medical Officer [17]. PRS's analysis adds that the bill removes the provision granting transgender persons the right to self-perceived identity [10].

In the Rajya Sabha, opposition members cited the Supreme Court's 2014 judgment in *National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India* (2014), known as *NALSA* [18], which recognized the right of transgender persons to self-identify their gender, and argued that the bill violated Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21. A member noted that it prescribes no qualifications for the Chief Medical Officer [19]. A member of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) defended the bill, stating that it would ensure justice, dignity, and protection against criminalization, and that increased penalties would lead to reduced crime and forced identities [19].

The timeline makes the point clearer. PRS records that the bill was introduced on 13 March, passed by the Lok Sabha on 24 March, and by the Rajya Sabha on 25 March; Parliament

passed it in 12 days [14]. Writing for The Quint in an opinion piece, two lawyers argued that the bill reached the agenda through a supplementary list of business added after the day's proceedings began, suggesting members had little time to read it [20]. The session was not marked by heavy disruption: PRS records that the Lok Sabha worked for 86% of its scheduled time and the Rajya Sabha for 92% in the Budget Session of 2026 [21].

Members asked for more time. In the Lok Sabha, Congress MP S. Jothimani said the bill had been introduced without consulting transgender individuals, and Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) MP T. Sumathy demanded that it be sent to a select committee [22]. Opposition MPs had made the same demand in the Business Advisory Committee earlier that day, according to The Quint [20]. DMK member Tiruchi Siva specifically requested that a select committee hear from stakeholders, legal experts, civil society, and the transgender community [23].

The Parliamentary Affairs Minister Kiren Rijiju claimed that extensive debate on the bill had taken place over a year, with a standing committee discussing the issue [20]. The Wire reported a government-side speaker making this claim [13]. However, The Quint's authors say no evidence was offered for it, and report that the chairperson and some members of the Standing Committee on Social Justice and Empowerment denied debating the issue when contacted by Queerbeat [20]. The authors also argue that the Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy was bypassed, with no public draft or feedback window [20].

A Lok Sabha debate of two hours and twenty-six minutes cannot genuinely hear from the community whose legal status is being redefined, take expert evidence on certification by a medical board, or test the *NALSA* question at length. A committee can do all three, as the 2016 committee's work showed [9].

The central constitutional question of whether the amendment can be reconciled with *NALSA* was not examined by a committee that could have heard the community concerned. This is the third layer of representation, reach, in its plainest form.

The Farm Bills

Sen notes that the three farm bills of 2020, which triggered widespread protests, were passed without committee scrutiny [6]. The resulting farm laws were later repealed [3]. This sequence suggests what scrutiny is for: it's cheaper to find problems before a law passes than after.

Consequential Bills Move Quickly

Briefness applies not only to political controversies. During the 2023 Monsoon Session, the Digital Personal Data Protection Bill, which sets out the rules for how organisations deal with people's personal data, was discussed for 56 minutes in the Lok Sabha and just over an hour in the Rajya Sabha [24]. The Forest Conservation (Amendment) Bill was discussed for 38 minutes in the Lok Sabha and an hour and 41 minutes in the Rajya Sabha [24]. In contrast, the Delhi Services Bill was discussed for four hours and 54 minutes in the Lok Sabha and about eight hours in the Rajya Sabha [24].

The bill to replace the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme was approved in December 2025, within 48 hours, despite strong opposition and protests, with the Rajya Sabha passing it just after midnight on the final day of the session [6]. Two other important bills, concerning insurance and nuclear energy, were also passed despite protests and walkouts [6]. These cases suggest that debate time is linked to political pressure rather than long-term consequences, although a small number of examples is not conclusive.

7. Why Is This Happening?

Causation is debated. What follows are contributing factors, not a settled account.

One factor is a **single-party majority**. Sen links part of the decline in referrals to a single-party majority in the Lok Sabha, which has allowed the government to bypass committees [6]. He argues that strong governing parties tend to resist specialised knowledge in committees because expertise may threaten their control of the legislature [6]. The highest referral rates came under the UPA coalition, and so the pattern fits the data [3][6].

A second factor is **the whip**. As mentioned previously, the Tenth Schedule reduces, in my understanding, the need for a government with a majority to persuade even its own benches.

A third factor is a **cycle of disruption**. The downside of disruption was seen most clearly in the 2026 Monsoon Session: with the Lok Sabha functioning for 15% of its time, bills were passed without discussion [4]. However, disruption alone does not explain everything. Throughout its term, the 17th Lok Sabha functioned for 88% of its scheduled time and the Rajya Sabha for 73% [3], yet 35% of bills were discussed for less than an hour. Making an observation on the 2025 Winter Session, Sen notes that despite the Lok Sabha functioning for 103% of its scheduled time and the Rajya Sabha for 104%, important bills were passed in haste and without committee scrutiny [6].

A fourth factor is a **shrinking calendar**. Because the 17th Lok Sabha held the fewest sittings of any full-term Lok Sabha and most of its sessions ended early [3], each bill competed for less time.

8. The Other Side

First, it would be fair for the government to say that disruption makes deliberation difficult. The Parliamentary Affairs Minister said after the 2026 Monsoon Session that the government was not satisfied with the quality of discussion because the opposition did not allow proper debate, especially in the Lok Sabha [5], and the session's low functioning is documented by PRS [4].

Second, rapid passage is not a recent occurrence, and not confined to one government. PRS's data show that the share of bills passed with less than an hour of discussion in the Lok Sabha was 36% in the 15th Lok Sabha, 15% in the 16th and 35% in the 17th [3]. Citing PRS data, Hindustan Times reported that 33 bills (18% of the total) were approved within five minutes each in the 14th Lok Sabha and 20 bills (17%) in the 15th, including eight bills passed in 17 minutes on 24 December 2008 while the opposition disrupted the House. It also reported that just one bill was passed in under five minutes in the first term of the Modi government [25].

The difference that the evidence suggests is in the share of bills sent to committees in recent years [3][6].

Third, referral has not vanished completely. A Corporate Laws (Amendment) Bill was referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee in March 2026 [26], and the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Bill (FCRA Bill) to a Joint Parliamentary Committee in the 2026 Monsoon Session [4]. Referral has become selective, and the bills that bypass it are sometimes the contested ones.

Fourth, committee referral is not the only form of deliberation. This analysis has not examined every consultation that precedes each bill, and a fuller study should.

Finally, referral rates and debate length are proxies for scrutiny, not direct measures of its quality. A bill may be referred to a committee yet receive limited examination, while a short floor debate may still raise important objections. These indicators therefore show whether the institutional space for scrutiny was used, rather than proving that scrutiny was absent in every case.

9. Reforms

Sen observes that the circumvention of committees has led to demands by some for mandatory scrutiny of legislation, but that these suggestions are unlikely to be implemented soon. He also notes that if current trends continue, the gains of the committee system risk being wasted [6].

Who can change things matters here. Roy argues that a robust law-making process rests on three principles: consulting stakeholders before a bill is brought, detailed committee scrutiny before it is passed, and a periodic assessment of how the law works afterwards. The first, he notes, is entirely in the government's hands. The second is formally the legislature's domain, but the executive controls the legislative agenda. The third is not institutionalised [8].

Six modest measures follow from the analysis above. They are my proposals, not findings.

First, where a bill affects fundamental rights and is not sent to a committee, the government could be asked to record its reasons. Because referral currently depends on the presiding officer and the rules do not mandate it [8], this could be done as a presumption of referral within existing procedure.

Second, a minimum interval between introduction and passage would give members and the public time to read a bill.

Third, the 2014 consultation policy could be made binding, or at least a bill's statement of objects could say whether it was followed, since PRS notes that the policy does not bind ministries [8]. Compliance is also weak: at least 40 of the 74 drafts placed in the public domain did not adhere to the 30-day period [8].

Fourth, a timetable for committees would answer the delay objection. Half of the reports on bills in the 17th Lok Sabha were presented within 115 days [3], so a deadline for committees examining rights-related bills would not be unrealistic.

Fifth, MPs need research support. Roy notes that MPs do not have a budget for hiring researchers, and argues that stronger scrutiny will require more resources for staff [8].

Sixth, taking into account the 206 suspensions in a single Lok Sabha, greater restraint in suspending MPs would be helpful [3].

A longer-term measure is periodic review of laws after they pass. Roy notes that this is episodic in India, and that some countries build review mechanisms into the law itself [8].

10. Conclusion

India's Parliament has not lost its formal power to legislate. What has weakened is its capacity, and in many cases, its willingness, to examine legislation before passing it. Committee referral, sustained debate, oral questions, and pre-legislative consultation are not procedural luxuries; they are the mechanisms through which Parliament holds the government accountable before a bill becomes law. Article 75(3) makes the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha, while Article 105(1) protects parliamentary speech; both lose practical meaning when bills are passed without adequate time for accountability or argument.

The evidence reviewed here shows a clear decline in these mechanisms. In the 17th Lok Sabha, only 16% of bills were sent to committees and 35% were passed after less than an hour of discussion; in the 2026 Monsoon Session, nine of eleven bills were passed without any non-ministerial member speaking. The passage of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Bill, 2026 without committee scrutiny shows that the problem is not limited to disrupted sessions or crowded agendas: even in a relatively productive session, a rights-sensitive bill affecting self-identified gender was passed within twelve days.

This does not mean that every quickly passed bill is badly made, or that committee referral alone guarantees good legislation. Committees can delay, governments may not accept their recommendations, and opposition disruption also contributes to the breakdown of deliberation. But the burden of explanation should lie with those who bypass scrutiny, particularly when bills affect fundamental rights, criminal law, data privacy, federal arrangements, or marginalised communities. A Parliament that passes laws without hearing those most affected may retain its legislative form while losing much of its representative function. Restoring scrutiny is therefore not merely a matter of parliamentary efficiency; it is a condition for a more accountable and legitimate democracy.

References

- [1] Constitution of India, Articles 75(3), 79, 93 and 105(1). *India Code*, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India. <https://indiacode.gov.in/home>
- [2] "One in five bills sent to panels: Data," *Hindustan Times*, 21 September 2020. <https://www.pressreader.com/india/hindustan-times-patiala/20200921/281951725246958>
- [3] N. S. Menon, "Vital stats: Functioning of the 17th Lok Sabha," PRS Legislative Research, 10 February 2024. https://prsindia.org/files/parliament/vital_stats/Functioning-

[17th Lok Sabha.pdf](#)

[4] PRS Legislative Research, “Functioning of Parliament during Monsoon Session 2026.”

<https://prsindia.org/sessiontrack/monsoon-session-2026/vital-stats>

[5] “‘12 bills passed, but Govt not satisfied with quality of discussion’: Kiren Rijiju targets Oppn,” Asian News International, 13 August 2026. <https://aninews.in/news/national/general-news/12-bills-passed-but-govt-not-satisfied-with-quality-of-discussion-kiren-rijiju-targets-oppn20260813131903/>

[6] Ronojoy Sen, “Rushing through critical legislations: Erosion of parliamentary scrutiny in India,” ISAS Brief No. 1326, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, 5 January 2026. <https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/ISAS-Brief-1326-.pdf>

[7] Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India, Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy, 2014 (copy). <https://regulatoryreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/India-Pre-legislative-consultation-policy-2014.pdf>

[8] Chakshu Roy, “The faults in India’s law-making process,” *The India Forum*, 28 January 2022 (reproduced by PRS Legislative Research). <https://prsindia.org/articles-by-prs-team/the-faults-in-india%E2%80%99s-law-making-process>

[9] PRS Legislative Research, summary of the Standing Committee on Social Justice and Empowerment’s report on the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Bill, 2016 (report dated 21 July 2017). <https://prsindia.org/billtrack/prs-products/prs-standing-committee-report-summary-2659>

[10] PRS Legislative Research, “Issues for consideration: The Transgender Persons (Amendment) Bill, 2026.”

https://prsindia.org/files/bills_acts/bills_parliament/2026/Issues_for_Consideration_Transgender_Bill_2026.pdf

[11] PRS Legislative Research, “The anti-defection law: Intent and impact” (discussion paper). https://prsindia.org/files/parliament/discussion_papers/Anti-Defection%20Law%20Intent%20and%20Impact_0.pdf

[12] “Without opposition, three British-era criminal laws being replaced for speedy justice,” *The Tribune*, 20 December 2023. <https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/india/without-opposition-three-british-era-criminal-laws-being-replaced-for-speedy-justice-573853>

[13] “‘Not reform but regression’: Opposition stages walkout as Lok Sabha passes transgender bill,” *The Wire*, March 2026. <https://m.thewire.in/article/rights/not-reform-but-regression-opposition-slams-lok-sabha-passing-transgender-bill-in-2-5-hours>

[14] PRS Legislative Research, “Legislation: Budget Session 2026.”

<https://prsindia.org/sessiontrack/budget-session-2026/bill-legislation>

[15] Press Trust of India, “Parliament passes transgender rights amendment bill 2026 amid opposition concerns in Rajya Sabha,” *Careers360*, 25 March 2026.

<https://news.careers360.com/parliament-passes-transgender-rights-amendment-bill-2026-amid-opposition-concerns-in-rajya-sabha/amp>

[16] Amnesty International, “India: Presidential approval of regressive Transgender Bill a major step backward for human rights,” March 2026.

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/03/india-presidential-approval-of-regressive->

[transgender-bill-a-major-step-backward-for-human-rights/](#)

[17] PRS Legislative Research, “The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Bill, 2026.” <https://prsindia.org/billtrack/the-transgender-persons-protection-of-rights-amendment-bill-2026>

[18] *National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India*, (2014) 5 S.C.C. 438 (India).

[19] “Parliament passes Transgender Persons Amendment Bill, 2026 with Rajya Sabha approving it today,” All India Radio News, 25 March 2026.

<https://www.newsonair.gov.in/parliament-passes-transgender-persons-amendment-bill-2026-with-rajya-sabha-approving-it-today>

[20] Maansi Verma and Afreen Azim, “Why the extraordinary rush to pass Trans Bill 2026 sans public feedback?” (opinion piece), *The Quint*, 31 March 2026.

<https://www.thequint.com/opinion/transgender-bill-2026-rushed-ministry-of-justice-social-empowerment>

[21] PRS Legislative Research, “Plan vs. performance: Budget Session 2026.”

<https://prsindia.org/sessiontrack/budget-session-2026/plan-performance>

[22] “Lok Sabha takes up Transgender Persons Amendment Bill, 2026 for consideration and passing,” All India Radio News, 24 March 2026. <https://www.newsonair.gov.in/lok-sabha-takes-up-transgender-persons-amendment-bill-2026-for-consideration-and-passing>

[23] Asian News International, “Rajya Sabha passes contentious Transgender Persons Amendment Bill 2026,” *Asianet Newsable*, March 2026.

<https://newsable.asianetnews.com/india/rajya-sabha-passes-contentious-transgender-persons-amendment-bill-2026-articleshow-vlm75c6>

[24] “Parliament functioned for less than half of scheduled time: Data,” *Deccan Herald*, 12 August 2023. <https://www.deccanherald.com/amp/story/india%2Fparliament-functioned-for-less-than-half-of-scheduled-time-data-2645398>

[25] “Hasty passage of bills not unique to NDA govt,” *Hindustan Times*, 21 August 2021.

<https://www.pressreader.com/india/hindustan-times-st-mumbai-live/20210821/281788517142017>

[26] PRS Legislative Research, “Monthly policy review: March 2026.”

<https://prsindia.org/policy/monthly-policy-review/march-2026>